CV

Mehmet Baç

Address (work):

Sabancı University

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

Orhanlı, Tuzla, Istanbul, Turkey 34956

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Phone (work): +(90) 216 4839257

Fax: : +(90) 216 4839250

e-mail: bac@sabanciuniv.edu

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Languages: Turkish, English, French.

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics (1990), Universite Laval, Quebec, Canada.

M.A. Economics (1986) Bogazici Universitesi, Istanbul, Turkey.

B.Sc. Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications (1983) ITU, Istanbul, Turkey.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

1990-1992 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Administrative Sciences, Universite Laval, Quebec, Canada.

1992-1998Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.

1998-2002 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.

1999-2000 Visiting Scholar, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.

2002-2004 Associate Professor, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey

2004-present Professor, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey

2008-2013 Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey

ADMINISTRATIVE (at Sabancı University)

Economics Programs Coordinator, (2002-2008);

Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (2008-2013).

AWARDS

TUBA (Turkish Academy of Sciences) Young Investigator (tesvik) Award, 1999.

TUBITAK (Science and Technology Research Council of Turkey) Science Award, 2008.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Associate Editor, Journal of Economics, (2014-present)

 

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS

Monographs: (1990) Three Essays on Sovereign Debt, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Université Laval, Quebec, Canada.

(2021 revised) Economic Approach to Property Law, unplublished lecture notes, 250p. Sabancı University.

Refereed Journal Articles

(1993) “Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts,” International Economic Review 34, 663-683.

(1995) “On the Term Structure of Sovereign Debt Contracts,” Review of International Economics 3, 174-185.

(1996a) “Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 22, 99-118.

(1996b) (with Horst Raff) “Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preferences,” Games and Economic Behavior 13, 125-134.

(1996c) “Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Environmental Resources,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30, 301-315.   (Beijer Institute Discussion Paper, 1995, no 60, Stockholm, Sweden.)

(1996d) “Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride,” Social Choice and Welfare 13, 419-432.

(1996e) “Corruption, Supervision and the Structure of Hierarchies,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 12, 277-298.

(1997a) (with Horst Raff) “A Theory of Trade Concessions,” Journal of International Economics 42, 483-504.

(1997b) “Bilateral Relationships Governed by Incomplete Contracts,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153, 319-333.

(1998a) “The Scope, Timing and Type of Corruption,” International Review of Law and Economics 12, 101-120.

(1998b) “Property Rights Regimes and the Management of Resources,” Natural Resources Forum 22, 263-269.

(1999a) (with Ismail Saglam) “Managerial Defections, Promotion Criteria and Firm Growth,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 17, 917-940.

(1999b) “Grace Periods in Sovereign Debt,” Review of International Economics 7, 322-327.

(2000a) “A Note on Efficient Signaling of Bargaining Power,” International Journal of Game Theory 29, 119-126.

(2000b) “Signaling Bargaining Power: Strategic Delay versus Restricted Offers,” Economic Theory 16, 227-237.

(2000c) “On-the-Job Specific Training and Efficient Screening,” Journal of Labor Economics 18, 681-701.

(2000d) “Switching Costs and Screening Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts,” Canadian Journal of Economics 33, 1034-1048.

(2001a) “To Invest or Screen Efficiently: A Potential Conflict in Relationships Governed by Incomplete Contracts,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 567-588.

(2001b) “Corruption, Connections and transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?” Public Choice 107, 87-96.

(2001c) “On Creating and Claiming Value in Negotiations,” Group Decision and Negotiation 10, 237-251.

(2001d) (with Parimal Kanti Bag) “Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions,” Journal of Comparative Economics. 29: 722-748.

(2002a) “On the Informational Content of Wage Offers,” International Economic Review. 43: 173-193.

(2002b) “Charitable Restricted Donations and the Cy-Pres Doctrine,” European Journal of Law and Economics. 14: 15-25.

(2002c) (with Parimal Kanti Bag) “Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side Transfers,” Theory and Decision. 52: 267-286.

(2003a) (with Parimal Kanti Bag) “Strategic Information Revelation in Fundraising,” Journal of Public Economics. 87: 659-679.

(2003b) (with Parimal Kanti Bag) “All-or-Nothing Verdict as a Screening Device,” Oxford Economic Papers 55: 536-559.

(2006a) (with Parimal Kanti Bag) “Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Non-monetary Penalties,” Journal of Development Economics. 81: 478-499.

(2006b) (with Serkan Kucuksenel) “Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162: 262-276.

(2007) “Optimal Supervision Intensity, Collusion, and the Organization of Work,” Canadian Journal of Economics 40: 317-339.

(2009a) “Generalized Trust and Wealth,” International Review of Law and Economics. 29: 46-56.

(2009b) “An Economic Rationale for Firing Whistleblowers,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 27(3): 233-256.

(2009c) (with Serife Genç) “The French First-Employment Contract: Instrument for Efficient Screening or a Kleenex Contract?” Journal of Economics. 98: 77-88.

(2009d) (with Parimal Kanti Bag) “Graduated Penalty Scheme,” International Review of Law and Economics. 29: 281-289.

(2010a) “The Interaction between Offenders’ and Victims’ Demands for Guns,” Journal of Public Economics. 94: 337-343.

(2010b) (with Eren Inci) “The old-boy network and the quality of entrepreneurs,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 19: 889-918.

(2014)  “Opinion Expressions under Social Sanctions,” International Review of Law and Economics 38: 58-71.

(2015) “On the Selection Effects under Consent and Unilateral Divorce” American Law and Economics Review, 17: 43-86.

(2016) “The Expectation Effect of Fall in Divorce Costs,” International Review of Law and Economics, 47: 41-47.

(2018) “Wages, Performance and Harassment,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 145: 232-248.

(2019) “Gift Policy, Bribes and Corruption”  European Journal of Law and Economics. 47: 255–275

(2022) “Crime Chains,”  American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14:  680-722.

(2023) “Quid Pro Quo Harassment, Contracts and Liability,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 56: 24-45.

(2023) “Transnational Crimes: How Nations should Cooperate and Why They Don’t.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming.

REPRINTS, CHAPTERS IN EDITED BOOKS

(1999a) “Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies,” reprinted as Chapter 7 in The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets, eds. J. Fiorentini and S. Zamagni, series: International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Edward Elgar Ltd. UK.

(1999b) “Corruption, Supervision and the Structure of Hierarchies,” reprinted as Chapter 6 in The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets, eds. J. Fiorentini and S. Zamagni, series: International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Edward Elgar Ltd. UK.

(2015, revised 2021) “Organization” in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Eds. Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello. Springer, Heidelberg.

WORKING PAPERS

(2021) (with Parinal Bag) “Does Having More Skin in the Game Liven Up Contests?” Working Paper.

(2022) (with Parimal Bag) “Coordination of Enforcement in Crime Chains” Working paper.