Research

Publications

  • Afacan, M.O (2018): The Object Allocation Problem with Random Priorities, Games and Economic Behavior, 110, 71-89
  • Afacan, M.O (2017): Some Further Properties of the Cumulative Offer Process, Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 656-665
  • Afacan, M.O. and Dur, U (2017): When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 72, 16-24
  • Afacan, M.O. and Alioğulları, Z.H. and Barlo, M (2017): Sticky Matching in the School Choice, Economic Theory, 64(3), 509-538
  • Afacan, M.O. and Dur, U (2017): Incompatibility Between Stability and Consistency, Economics Letters, 150, 135-137
  • Afacan, M.O. (2016): Characterizations of the Cumulative Offer Process, Social Choice and Welfare, 47, 531-542
  • Afacan, M.O. (2016): Enrollment Manipulations in School Choice, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 63, 119-125.
  • Afacan, M.O. and Salman, U (2016): Affirmative Actions: The Boston Mechanism Case, Economics Letters, 141, 95-97.
  • Afacan, M.O. and Turhan, B (2015): On Relationships Between Substitutes conditions, Economics Letters, 126, 10-12.
  • Afacan, M.O. (2014): Fictitious Students Creation Inventives in School Choice Problems, Economic Theory, 56(3), 493-514.
  • Afacan, M.O. (2013): Application Fee Manipulations in Matching Markets, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49(6), 446-453.
  • Afacan, M.O. (2013): Alternative Characterizations of Boston Mechanism, Mathematical Social Sciences, 66(2), 176-179.
  • Afacan, M.O. (2013): The Welfare Effects of Pre-arrangements in Matching Markets, Economic Theory, 53(1), 139-151.
  • Afacan, M.O. (2012):  On the “Group Non-bossiness Property”, Economics Bulletin, 32(2), 1571-1575.
  • Afacan, M.O. (2012): Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets, Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1),  394-398.

Working Papers

  • School Choice with Vouchers (R&R, Journal of Economic Theory)
  • Matching with Restricted Trade (R&R, International Journal of Game Theory)
  • An Axiomatic Characterization of the Constrained Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
  • Matching with Limited Resignation (with Umut Mert Dur)
  • Graduate Admission with Financial Support
  • Assignment Maximization (with Bertan Turhan and Inacio Bo)
  • A Task Allocation Problem
  • Strategy-Proof Size Improvement: Is it Possible? (with Umut Mert Dur)

In Progress

  • Object Allocation with Limited Information
  • Ordered Object Allocation (with Sinan Ertemel)