Turkey is currently one of the 13 candidates for European Union (EU) membership. Among these candidates, it has a long association with the EU (since 1963) and the oldest standing application for membership (since 1987). Despite this history, when the EU embarked on its enlargement process in the 1990s it did not include Turkey in its list of prospective candidates. During the Luxembourg summit of December 1997, the European Council decided to clear the path for the Union’s enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus, basing its decision upon the European Commission’s proposal in its Agenda 2000 of July 1997. However, it was only quite recently, during the Helsinki summit of the European Council of December 1999, that the EU included Turkey in this process of enlargement by granting it candidacy. Officially, the major obstacle to Turkey’s accession is the need to meet the Copenhagen criteria adopted in 1993, but there are other important obstacles that are not part of the Copenhagen criteria which still play a significant role in the accession process, such as Turkey’s relations with Greece—a member of the EC/EU since 1981. Particularly important within the general framework of Turkey’s relations with Greece is the Cyprus problem. The EU’s Accession Partnership Document (APD) of November 2001 has included the resolution of the Cyprus issue among the medium term objectives that Turkey must meet. Thus, Turkey’s adherence to the Copenhagen criteria will officially determine when and under what conditions the EU will begin accession negotiations with Turkey, but the resolution of the Cyprus conflict is likely to be an equally important factor in determining the opening date for Turkey’s accession negotiations. It is, therefore, important to assess the extent to which the Turkish public and its representatives are aware of the critical importance of these factors.

Throughout this often turbulent history of relations between the EU and Turkey very little was known about how Turkish citizens view these relations. This analysis begins by briefly reviewing Turkish-EU relations
in terms of the obstacles to Turkey’s accession, and then presents the results of a survey that was conducted among a rather important portion of the Turkish citizenry, deputies in the Turkish parliament—namely the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi—TBMM). These individuals are important not only as representatives of public opinion related to the EU but also as decisionmakers in the adoption of new legislation which is required to meet EU standards. Specifically, Turkish members of parliament (MPs) must give final approval to the government’s EU-related proposals, many of which touch upon extremely controversial issues such as minority rights and privatization of industries. The MPs’ perceptions of the EU are, to a great extent, shaped by their party line and affiliations. Nevertheless, it is important to assess their individual perceptions as they are representatives of the mass public.

Our survey of 61 MPs was conducted in April/May 2000. The results indicate that, despite the ups and downs in Turkish-EU relations and some fears that cultural/religious issues might prevent Turkey from one day becoming a full EU member state, most members of the Turkish Parliament are rather hopeful about Turkey joining the EU in the relatively near future. The results that address the perceived obstacles facing Turkey, the benefits to be gained from membership and the attitudes towards one of the specific issues involved in Turkish-EU relations—the Cyprus issue—are the focus of the current analysis.

We believe that in terms of the Turkish political elite’s perceptions of EU membership and Turkey’s position in the EU’s enlargement process the findings of this contribution will shed light on Turkey’s negotiations with the EU and its future prospects. Specifically, should the results indicate a lack of consensus regarding Turkey’s accession to the EU or a lack of acceptance of the potential problems that must first be resolved this will not bode well for Turkey’s future EU membership. The reforms that must be made in order to meet the EU’s Copenhagen criteria are extensive and some will be economically and politically painful. If there is no consensus regarding EU membership in the first place it will be quite difficult for the government to continue pushing through the necessary changes in the TBMM. Similarly, results indicating a lack of understanding among the deputies concerning the significance of Cyprus in Turkey’s relations with the EU—or no willingness to concede that that there is a problem in Cyprus—would not bode well for generating a domestic consensus on its resolution, even though the resolution of the Cyprus conflict is not part of the Copenhagen criteria. Thus, we believe an analysis of the attitudes of the Turkish political elite is important in order to assess the nature of Turkey’s negotiations with the EU.
At the end of the Second World War a new European order was created with the establishment of new institutions. Turkey became a member of several European and western organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD [1948]), the Council of Europe (1949) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO [1952]). The quest for external validation of its European credentials and a desire to participate in a community of Europeans eventually led leaders to apply for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EC) in 1959. The Ankara Agreement, modeled according to the Greek Association Agreement—the Athens Treaty, was signed in 1963. Article 28 of the Ankara Treaty stipulates that Turkey’s full membership would be possible when both the EC and the Turkish political elite find that Turkey would be able to meet the obligations of membership. Thus, there was a great deal of encouragement for Turkey to continue on its stated path of becoming part of the community of Europe.

Turkey is one of two countries whose Association Agreement (AA) stipulated that it would be welcome to join the EC as a full member at a future date when able to fulfil the requirements of membership; the other country with a similar clause in its AA being Greece. The Association Agreement was amended in 1970 with the signing of the Additional Protocol, which stated the ultimate goal as the creation of a customs union between Turkey and the EC by December 31, 1995. Relations between the two sides, however, were far from cordial between the time of the Additional Protocol and the establishment of the Customs Union. This was partly as a result of perceived bad relations and partly because the prime minister at the time, Bülent Ecevit, was concerned about the negative effects of moving forward with the completion of the Customs Union and wanted to catch up to the EC countries before continuing with the tariff reductions. Turkey then froze relations with the EC in 1978. To make matters worse, Turkey experienced a military coup in 1980 and, since the EC does not associate itself with non-civilian governments, the Association Agreement was frozen. However, in 1986, under Turgut Özal, a prime minister who believed that economic integration with the EC would be good for the Turkish economy, relations finally began to return to normal, and a year later Turkey applied for full membership of the EC.

By this time, Greece, Spain and Portugal had been accepted into the EC as full members, and the Commission’s response to the Turkish application was that accession negotiations between the EC and any country could not feasibly begin until 1993 because of the need for further deepening of
integration among the current members. The Commission recommended revitalization of the Association Agreement with the realization of a customs union as a short-term goal. In line with the Commission’s recommendation, a customs union for industrial products was realized on December 31, 1995, as foreseen by the Ankara Treaty and the Additional Protocol. It should be noted that Turkey is the only country that realized a customs union with the EC prior to full membership.

Turkish hopes for full membership in the EU evaporated with the Luxembourg European Council summit meeting of December 1997, which delivered a major blow to Turkish-EU relations: it was decided that accession negotiations were open to all applicant countries except Turkey. The former communist countries, as well as Cyprus, appeared to have moved up in the queue, and many of these countries are likely to be included in the next wave of enlargement. The period from 1997–99 was turbulent for Turkey’s aspirations in the EU, with widespread expressions of hopelessness and hostility towards the EU. However, since 1999, there has been a major breakthrough in Turkish-EU relations. Somewhat unexpectedly, the EU opened the door for Turkish candidacy, relatively shortly after the aforementioned ominous Luxembourg summit. Apparently, within two years of the Luxembourg summit, EU preferences changed, and by the December 1999 Helsinki summit the countries that had been the strongest holdouts on Turkey’s membership, namely Germany and Greece, finally gave in and agreed to grant Turkey candidacy.

On November 8, 2000, the European Commission adopted its Accession Partnership Document for Turkey, which was approved in the General Affairs Council of December 4, 2000, and finally adopted by the Council on March 8, 2001. Turkey adopted its National Program for the Adoption of the acquis on March 19, 2001. Despite these positive developments, as of the summer of 2002, accession negotiations with Turkey have not begun. Consequently, Turkey is the only candidate country that the EU did not include in its calculations of voting power and representation in the EU institutions made at the Nice summit in December 2000.

As the above section illustrates, Turkey’s relations with the EU have been an integral part of its foreign policy since the end of the 1950s and gained significant momentum in the 1990s with the EU’s enlargement process. Although Turkish-EU relations date back to the 1950s, until quite recently very little has been known about Turkish public opinion regarding the European Union and, even with the conducting of public opinion polls on attitudes toward the EU within the last year, there has not been much focus on elite opinions. On the other hand, Turkish political leaders themselves do not seem to have a proper understanding of what EU
membership entails. For example, Ecevit’s perception of the EC in the 1970s and Özal’s in the 1980s seem to be based solely on economic terms, most probably underestimating the political dynamics of European integration. Moreover, some of the constitutional reforms that have been proposed by these elites—especially related to the role of the National Security Council and to Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code, which deals with punishments for criticizing the state—indicate a fairly fundamental misunderstanding regarding the sort of reforms the EU is demanding. A few things, though, have been learned about non-political elites through a survey conducted by McLaren in 2000 with business people, journalists, academics and bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{13} The results of that study indicate considerably favorable attitudes towards Turkey’s potential EU membership as well as hope that it will indeed occur in the relatively near future. However, those in the position of law and policymaking regarding Turkey’s adoption of the \textit{acquis} have not yet been interviewed to assess their opinions on Turkish-EU relations. Thus, we aim to open the black box of the Turkish state by studying the attitudes of the political elites in Turkey towards the EU, or, at least, to gain some insights regarding it.

Similarly, very little research has been conducted in analyzing attitudes towards EU membership among the candidate countries. Recent work on this subject is mostly directed towards the Central and Eastern European countries and the publics of the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{14} We believe studying public support in candidate countries towards EU membership is important in order to gain new insights into the much-neglected aspects of EU enlargement and the attitudes of the candidate countries. Using a survey conducted among a random sample of Turkish MPs in April and May 2000, we investigate deputies’ views on whether Turkey will ever join the EU, what they perceive as the most important obstacles facing the country’s membership and what they see as the largest advantages and disadvantages of joining the EU. One should keep in mind that the survey was conducted in spring 2000 and some of the MPs’ perceptions might have changed since then.

\section*{The Survey}

The Turkish parliament comprises of 550 members. Because of resource limitations, we were able to select roughly ten percent of the entire assembly for an interview. A combination of stratified and systematic sampling was used to select the sample. In order to ensure adequate representation from the various parties in the assembly, we compiled a list of deputies sorted by party and then alphabetically by surname within the
party list. We then systematically selected every ninth deputy, the first one being selected randomly by computer program. As the list was in order by party, this ensured that the party distribution in the sample would approximate the party distribution in the parliament. If a deputy could not be interviewed, then the person above him or below him on the list was chosen by a flip of a coin. Approximately ten percent of the sample had to be reselected in this manner.

Before discussing the substantive results of the survey, we will first describe the basic characteristics of the respondents. Almost all respondents in the sample were male (97 percent), but since only four percent of the entire TBMM is female, this overwhelmingly male response was expected. Most of the respondents (71 percent) held an undergraduate degree, with a small minority having received a Master’s or Ph.D. (ten percent had either an MA or MS and seven percent had a Ph.D.) and another minority having finished school at the high school level or lower (five percent had finished primary or secondary school, while eight percent had finished high school). The percentages from each party were: Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*—ANAP), 13 percent; True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*—DYP), eight percent; Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*—DSP), 18 percent; Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*—FP), 33 percent; Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*—MHP), 28 percent.

These percentages under-represent ANAP by about three percent, DYP by about eight percent, and DSP by approximately seven percent, but over-represents FP by approximately 14 percent and MHP by about five percent. It is well known from sampling theory that the smaller the sample size, the larger the likelihood of drawing an unrepresentative sample. A sample of 61 (which is the number of our respondents) is extremely small, and thus the fact that it does not represent the parties perfectly is not all that surprising. In our case, the political right—the Virtue Party and the Nationalist Action Party—is particularly over-represented. This could have implications for the opinions and preferences reported by our respondents. In order to check for this, we constructed a variable which weights the deputies according to the actual size of their party in the parliament, reducing the weight of the FP and MHP deputies and increasing the weight of the other deputies. However, the multivariate analyses are virtually identical whether the weighted or unweighted data is used. Thus, we report the unweighted results. On the other hand, the observations are weighted for the one analysis that includes a comparison across the parties so that we can make some speculation about the preferences of the governing coalition between 1999 and 2002 (see section on Cyprus below).
What are the obstacles that Turkish MPs see facing Turkish full membership of the EU? The survey measures the perceptions of these obstacles and, in that manner, we hoped to unveil any discrepancies between the Turkish MPs’ perceptions about the EU’s reservations towards Turkey and the EU reality.

We expected the answers to this question to be based on a few different sources. One source is the reports of the European Commission on the problems facing Turkey’s EU membership. Although Turkey was still not included in the list of candidate countries at the time of the June 1998 Cardiff Council, the EU attempted to bring Turkey back into the realm of the EU by suggesting that it should continue working towards full membership. To that end, the Council asked the European Commission to write a report on Turkey’s candidacy. In fact, all of the candidate countries’ progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria has been evaluated by the European Commission on an annual basis since 1998. The objectivity of these criteria is best summarized by the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement, Guenther Verheugen, who contends that “negotiations should proceed on the basis of merit not on the basis of compassion.”  

Turkey, as a candidate country, is subject to this evaluation in terms of its ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

The first report on Turkey in 1998 emphasized the following political and economic problems. The political problems are related to three important issues: human rights violations, including torture and lack of freedom of expression, mostly resulting from the conflict in the southeastern part of the country; military (that is, National Security Council) independence from civilian control; and Turkey’s handling of the Cyprus issue. The economic problems mentioned include: inefficiency in the agricultural sector due to small farm holdings; financial sector problems revolving around the problem of a small number of banks holding a large amount of assets; inflation; socio-economic problems like illiteracy, infant mortality and poor health care; regional disparities in GNP and socio-economic development; price setting in agriculture, energy and transport; and the domination of manufacturing by small firms which would likely have difficulty if they faced more competition from manufacturing companies in the EU.

Four more Commission reports have been issued since then, in October 1999, November 2000, November 2001 and October 2002, all of which mentioned the same problems. Thus, after repeatedly hearing the same issues related to political and economic problems raised by the Commission, it seems likely that Turkish members of parliament will
themselves emphasize many of these problems. The Progress Reports of 1998 and 1999 and the Commission’s 1989 Opinion on Turkey’s application preceded the survey, thus we expected the MPs to raise these problems.

In addition to Turkey’s ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria, we expected the deputies to emphasize Turkey’s religious differences and large population size as other major obstacles to its membership. These problems are not stated officially by the EU, in line with maintaining the ostensible objectivity of Copenhagen criteria. Particularly after the implicit rejection of Turkish candidacy during the Luxembourg summit, many Turks began to believe that the problem with Turkey was not the economy or the political system but that the EU rejected Turkey’s candidacy for religious and cultural reasons. This feeling is substantiated by the fact that other prospective members have had similar problems (Romania, for example) and were still granted candidacy. By the mid-1990s, based on comparative measures such as Freedom House scores, Romania and Turkey were roughly equivalent in terms of democratic development. Moreover, Romania’s GDP/capita was approximately half that of Turkey. Although Romania’s political situation improved rapidly between 1996 and 1997, from the Turkish point of view it might have seemed rather odd (and suspicious) that the country would be accepted as a candidate for full membership so quickly, even after such improvements. The fact that another politically and economically backward country was accepted into the EU circle fairly easily, whereas Turkey was not, led to speculation regarding why this might be the case. Such speculation was that the real problems for Turkish membership are the rather unmentionable factors of religion and culture.

Until the Helsinki summit there was a great deal of pessimism and a belief that “they will never let us in” because of these cultural and religious factors, and that the Europeans were simply hiding their cultural prejudice by emphasizing human rights problems in Turkey. As one scholar contends, “There often seems to be an air of unreality—not to say disbelief—in Brussels and the Community at large about the very idea of Turkish membership.” Former Turkish prime minister Mesut Yılmaz accused the EU of erecting another Berlin Wall in Europe around cultural identity with the Luxembourg decision. Some of the declarations coming from the EU front did not help matters either as seen in the example of the European People’s Party (the Europe-wide Christian Democratic group) declaration of March 4, 1997: “The European Union is a civilization project and within this civilization project, Turkey has no place.” Thus, while we expect that the Helsinki summit should have dispelled much of this belief, there might be some lingering doubt about these issues in the minds of the Turkish elite.
Similarly, we expected the deputies to emphasize the population factor and the difficulty of incorporating Turkey into the EU structure. With a relatively poor population of approximately 68 million, there are also concerns of mass migration from Turkey to the EU, redistribution of regional development funds and allocation of votes and seats in EU institutions such as the Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament. The impact of this concern was illustrated with the Nice Council’s decision to omit Turkey from the calculations of voting power in an enlarged Union. Turkey’s population is larger than all member states except Germany, as well as the candidate countries; in this context, one should note that the second most populous country among the candidates is Poland, with only 39 million people. The population factor is, of course, not part of the Copenhagen criteria but nonetheless it would be an important factor impacting on Turkey’s membership to the EU.

We posed the question about obstacles facing Turkey in two different ways. In the first question, we simply asked “In your opinion, what is the most important obstacle that must be overcome before Turkey will be admitted to the EU as a full member?” The MP was allowed to answer this question freely, giving multiple answers. The summary of responses to this question appears in Table 1. These findings indicate that the deputies in the parliament overwhelmingly emphasize the political difficulties facing Turkey: problems of democratization, human rights improvement, and even improvement of the legal structure. There is also, however, some emphasis on socio-economic problems, including general economic problems, as well as specific human development problems, but it appears that—according to the MPs in TBMM—the most important issues that must be resolved are political.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political problems: human rights violations, democratization</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic problems: economic development, infrastructure, education</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal structure</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural differences</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of the Turkish population</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of responses*</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * This category includes responses such as problems in the Southeastern part of the country, the bureaucracy, and prejudice/hostility from the west.

** Multiple responses were allowed.
The second way in which this question was asked was by presenting the deputy with a list of potential obstacles facing Turkish membership of the EU and to ask him/her to rank these in terms of importance. The obstacle list appears in Table 2, along with the percentage of respondents who indicated each of these as the first—most important—obstacle. The percentages in this table mostly mirror those in Table 1. We find a rather large emphasis on political problems, mostly democratization and human rights development, with some acknowledgement of the importance of the role of the military in politics, but a reduced emphasis on problems of economic development. Furthermore, while very few deputies mentioned problems of religion in the open-ended question (Table 1), when presented with it in a list of potential obstacles 13 percent of the sample pointed to this problem as the most important obstacle. Thus, we find some concern among political elites that this somewhat unmentionable (and unchangeable) factor will keep Turkey out of the EU. As for the population factor, we found very little emphasis on the role of population: only one percent of the MPs mentioned this factor as the most important obstacle in an open-ended format and seven percent in the prepared list of obstacles. We found this to be an interesting result given the current debate in the EU on institutional reform and voting and representation weight of the member states. It is also worthwhile to note that, while population is not openly identified by EU officials as an important obstacle for Turkey’s accession negotiations, it is raised as an important consideration behind closed doors, threatening member states with unwanted immigration, loss of structural funds and increased contributions to the EU budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political problems: human rights violations, democratization</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of economic development</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s being a Muslim country</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position of the military in politics</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large size of the population</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems in the Southeastern part of the country</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All or several of these are equally important</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young population</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these are obstacles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of responses</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cyprus

Since 1993, the resolution of the Cyprus problem has become a foreign policy objective for the EU. The EU opened accession negotiations with Cyprus following the 1997 Luxembourg summit, hoping that EU membership would provide an incentive to the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots to resolve their differences. The possibility of Cyprus’ membership in the EU is becoming more concrete as EU members would like to see the first wave of entrants participate in the European Parliament elections to be held in 2004 and Cyprus will accede to the EU on May 1, 2004. The Cyprus problem clearly impacts on Turkey’s negotiations with the EU as well as its pre-screening process. For example, during the preparations of the Commission’s APD for Turkey, “Greece persuaded its 14 members in the Union to add resolving the division of Cyprus to the list of short-term actions that they (Turks) must carry out before the start of membership negotiations.” Currently, Greece is threatening to hold up the EU’s eastern enlargement plans if Cyprus is not included in the next wave of enlargement. Thus, the EU would like to see a settlement of the dispute over the island as soon as possible.

The EU has made its views known clearly and firmly regarding the need to resolve the Cyprus issue before Turkey can enter the EU—although this issue was not included in the Copenhagen criteria. It is, therefore, rather surprising that in the questions regarding obstacles facing Turkey in its bid to join the EU there appears to be a severe de-emphasis on resolving the Cyprus issue among the MPs. Not a single deputy mentioned this as a problem for Turkey’s candidacy in the open-ended format, and only three percent mentioned it when prompted with this option in a list of potential obstacles. As indicated above, this stipulation is repeated in the Commission Reports in 1998 and 1999, both prior to the survey. The implication seems to be that if Turkey can resolve the other problems—democratization, human rights improvement and economic development—the Cyprus issue will not really be a major obstacle and that the EU would allow Turkey into the organization regardless of the fact that Cyprus remains divided. It should be noted that these results mirror those from the non-political elite survey, in which only one person mentioned problems with Greece as being an obstacle to Turkey’s candidacy.

The de-emphasis of this major conflict with Greece among all influential groups—political and non-political alike—could have its roots in a failure to fundamentally accept that there is a problem in Cyprus, and this, in turn, has its roots in a belief that the international community has taken the wrong side of the dispute. In other words, if you perceive that your side has done nothing wrong you are also likely to perceive that there
is no problem to overcome. Indeed, statements from high-ranking state officials, including the former prime minister, make it clear that the resolution of this problem does not involve any change in Turkish policy with regard to Northern Cyprus. As Prime Minister Ecevit has stated, “During the Helsinki talks we underlined our sensitivity on the Cyprus issue. We stressed that we would not make a concession on that issue … When clearing the path for us by giving us candidate status, the EU knew that there were two states in Cyprus. It would be out of the question for the EU to expect Turkey to change its well-known views now.”

In order to determine whether there is a consensus regarding the solution to this problem, we asked the deputies how they believe the issue will be resolved (see the Appendix for the exact wording). We expected that if the resolution of this dispute is taken seriously by the Turkish leadership there would be a general outline of the expected goals of the conflict resolution and, in turn, that MPs would know what those expected goals are. Instead, we found a very divided distribution of responses: 48 percent of the deputies claimed that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) must be recognized as a sovereign state; 46 percent said that the two sides should be reunited in a federal state; and two percent stated that the problem will never be resolved. Thus, roughly equal numbers of deputies argue for extremely conflicting outcomes for this dispute.

However, even the notion of following the party line on the issue of Cyprus is questionable. While it may seem as if there is actually a great deal of discussion of this issue and that parties are simply in conflict over how to resolve it, when we examine the responses to this question by the deputy’s party affiliation we see that within the parties there is a great deal of dispute (see Table 3). ANAP—a center-right party—appears to be most internally divided over how the Cyprus problem will be resolved, with the FP and its successor Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi—SP)—the religiously oriented party—following closely behind. Even within the nationalist MHP not all deputies take the expected view that Northern Cyprus must be recognized as an independent state.

The findings presented in Table 3 also make it clear that if the parliament eventually becomes involved in resolving the dispute, reaching an agreement is going to be extremely difficult due to general disagreement that not only prevails across parties but within the parties themselves. For example, under the former governing coalition (DSP-MHP-ANAP), reaching a solution parliament would be able to digest would be nearly impossible: most DSP deputies lean towards reunification as a solution, most MHP deputies support recognition as an independent state as a solution, and ANAP deputies are quite divided, as indicated above.
Furthermore, there appears to be a great deal of discrepancy between the prime minister’s views on resolving the issue and those of his deputies in the parliament. As indicated, Ecevit, who was also the prime minister during the 1974 intervention, seems quite unwilling to make concessions on the Cyprus issue, insisting that there are (and presumably always will be) two different states on the island of Cyprus. As Ecevit clearly states, he believes that if the EU extends membership to Cyprus without an overall settlement on the island’s internal political future, Ankara may take the drastic measure of annexing TRNC. However, the responses of his party members in TBMM point to a very different position and indicate that they believe the dispute will end with the reunification of Northern and Southern Cyprus. Overall, the position of the prime minister is quite different from that of the parliamentary coalition supporting him.

We also asked the deputies if they believed that the EU favors the Greek side in Turkish-Greek relations. Eighty-five percent of the deputies believed this to be the case. Thus, part of the obstinacy related to the Cyprus issue on the part of the Turkish government might stem from the perception that there is an unwarranted bias against the Turkish side of the dispute.

### Support for EU Membership and Perceived Costs and Benefits

Regarding hopes about Turkey eventually joining the EU as a full member, we expected the Helsinki summit to have produced elites who are quite favorable and hopeful about Turkey’s EU membership. However, this summit did not erase all negative feelings and there remain skeptics who voice statements such as “the EU would never allow a situation that would
upset its own social, economic and cultural balances to develop. As the EU is working out how to delay the entry of the other 12 candidate countries, the terrifying cost of Turkey’s entry positively precludes her from ever becoming a full member.”38 Thus, we expected some degree of skepticism from political elites with regard to the question of Turkish membership of the EU. In fact, we find that all but one deputy responded that they were either strongly in favor or in favor of Turkey joining the EU as a full member. Moreover, an overwhelming 64 percent of the sample claimed to be strongly in favor of full EU membership for their country. Regarding the time frame for joining, we find only a slight amount of the same sort of skepticism expressed above, with five deputes (eight percent) arguing that Turkey will never be able obtain full EU membership. A small minority (12 percent) of deputies believed that Turkey would be able to join the EU within the next five years, but the rest of the deputies were not quite as hopeful about a short time frame: 30 percent believed full EU membership was possible within the next ten years; 16 percent thought it could happen in the next 15 years; and 12 percent believed EU membership would occur within the next 20 years. In addition, seven percent argued that the process will take longer than 20 years and 15 percent thought that the time frame is difficult to estimate. Thus, while skepticism and hopelessness regarding Turkey’s realistic chances for someday joining the EU are evident, we find a great deal of hope that full EU membership is indeed possible in the relatively near future. These results are quite similar to the findings of a non-political elites survey in which 86 percent were reported to be in favor of Turkey becoming a full EU member and 52 percent thought that membership would be granted to Turkey within ten years.39 Note that the non-political elites survey was conducted in the spring of 1999, several months before the landmark Helsinki summit (and still in the shadow of Luxembourg), and so we contend that the results of the deputies survey do not merely reflect the jubilance of the Helsinki summit results. Thus, overall, we can confidently claim that Turkish elites are supportive of Turkey’s membership in the EU but are not overly optimistic about the realization of this project in the near future.

What do the political elites see as the major benefits and costs of full EU membership? As was the case when asked about obstacles to full membership, the emphasis is on political development—such as improved democratization and more respect for human rights (see Table 4). That is not to say that socio-economic factors are unimportant. Indeed, this category comes in as a close second response to the political development response. We expected a great deal of concern for establishing European credentials or finally becoming part of Europe as a major benefit of EU
membership but, surprisingly, only a small minority (13 percent) of the responses of political elites point to the importance of this factor. Evidently, our respondents are mostly concerned with the political and economic development that will occur once Turkey is accepted into the EU. In contrast, with the non-political elites, the overwhelming response was that Turkey’s socio-economic development would improve. The second most popular response was that Turkey’s European credentials would finally be established. Emphasis on democratization and human rights came in a distant third.  

Finally, we wanted to observe whether the deputies are concerned about any major costs that would burden Turkey should it join the EU. The most frequent response to this question is that there will be no disadvantages to Turkey from full EU membership (26 percent). However, a similar number of parliamentarians (24 percent) were concerned that there would be some cultural degeneration or that there would be economic deterioration (23 percent) if Turkey joins the EU as a full member. As might be expected, based on the ideological stances of the parties, MHP and FP deputies emphasized the cultural degeneration issue more than other deputies. In fact, all but one of the deputies who mentioned this potential problem were from either the MHP or the FP. ANAP and DSP deputies mentioned the possibility of economic problems more, although some FP and MHP deputies discussed this issue as well. In addition, a minority of the deputies (17 percent) expressed concern that there would be a loss of power or loss of sovereignty as a result of EU membership. This was emphasized in relatively equal numbers across parties. When asked specifically if they thought Turkey’s sovereignty would be decreased if the country were to

TABLE 4  
MOST IMPORTANT ADVANTAGE OF BECOMING A FULL EU MEMBER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantage</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human rights violations, democracy will improve</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic development</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becoming part of Europe/the West</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free movement of goods, services, people</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reform</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of responses**</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * This category includes responses such as: cultural development, globalization and integration into the world system, the development of universal values, and the state will become more powerful.  
** Multiple responses were allowed.
become a full EU member, only 44 percent replied affirmatively. Thus, the potential loss of sovereignty does not appear to be a major concern of the deputies in the parliament. This finding illustrates that among the political elites—who should be concerned most about the probable loss of sovereignty for Turkey—there is a lack of comprehension as to what EU membership would entail. This brings us to the analysis of knowledge about the EU among the deputies. Given the fact that most of the conflict in the EU stems from balancing supranational authority with protection of national interests and state sovereignty, it is inevitable that Turkey during its negotiations will have to deal openly with this issue. The political elites’ perceptions that this is not an absolutely important issue are partly explained by the general lack of knowledge as to what the process of European integration is about.

**KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE EU**

Conventional wisdom about members of the Turkish parliament is that they are not very well informed about most issues, especially issues that are not directly related to domestic politics. We wanted to test this notion, but in a somewhat indirect manner in order to avoid offending the interviewees. To indirectly gauge knowledge of the EU, we asked the following two questions:41 “Would any government change in an EU member state affect Turkey’s prospects for joining the EU?” and “If Turkey joins the EU (meaning that it will already have accomplished the economic requirements), will it be able to comply with the requirements of the euro?” The first question was asked based on the assumption that deputies in the parliament should know that the German government which was in power at the time of the interview (a Social Democratic-Green coalition under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder) was much more favorable towards Turkey’s candidacy than the previous Christian Democratic-led governments. Indeed, the change in the German government in 1998 was one of the key factors that paved the way for Turkey’s candidacy for full EU membership. However, deputies in the parliament were mostly oblivious to the effect that changes in member state governments can have on external policy: only 12 percent of them thought that such a change might affect Turkey’s prospects for joining the EU. From the answers to these questions, we gather that the MPs do not have a clear understanding of the decisionmaking procedures in the EU.

The second question was chosen because it was expected that the members of TBMM would have some idea as to what economic standards would have to be met in order to join the euro-zone. The euro requirements
are beyond the economic requirements of accession to the extent to which even current members have difficulties in meeting them. Clearly, Turkey’s economy does not come close to meeting these standards, and we expected deputies to acknowledge this fact. Participation in the euro-zone requires strict adherence to macroeconomic stability and realization of rigid rules on interest rates, public debt and budget deficit figures. Even though Turkey’s macroeconomic indicators are nowhere near the euro requirements, 84 percent of the deputies interviewed claimed that Turkey could indeed meet the requirements for participating in the adoption of the euro. The results from this question and the one discussed above indicate that, unfortunately, those who are making decisions about Turkey’s adoption of the EU acquis seem to have very little knowledge about the EU itself. Turkish ability to meet the economic aspects of the Copenhagen criteria and the euro requirements are two different things. If the deputies responded “yes” based on the assumption that once Turkey meets the economic aspects of accession criteria this would also suffice for entering the euro-zone, this demonstrates a lack of knowledge about the EU’s monetary standards for the euro.

CONCLUSION

With the EU’s enlargement process going ahead at full speed, there is much discussion in Turkey among politicians and media personalities about orchestrating reforms—such as economic restructuring and changing the legal and penal codes—solely for the sake of finally being accepted into the “club.” However, despite its importance, we find surprisingly little information regarding mass or elite opinions on the issue until very recently. This analysis was an attempt to fill this gap by gauging the thoughts and concerns of one part of the Turkish public—its nationally elected officials.

What insights do these elites provide into the nature of Turkish-EU relations? First, the consensus regarding full EU membership is encouraging. There does not appear to be any opposition whatsoever to Turkey entering the EU as a full member someday. Such overwhelming support will, of course, be necessary during a time of extensive reform in preparation for accession. Additionally, the level of hope is quite high. Even before the Helsinki summit, at which Turkey was granted candidacy, such hope among non-political elites was also surprisingly high. In other words, political and non-political elites alike do not express too much concern that the EU will never allow Turkey into the “club.” This hopefulness is important because if elites believe that the
effort of preparation—especially the adoption of EU legislation—is in vain, then their support is likely to wane quickly. This is also an important consideration as, in July 2002, the Turkish parliament adopted a major constitutional package dealing with such issues as the abolition of death penalty and the right of education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. This was quite an important step towards EU membership, but, as noted, far more is likely to be required, and the political will of Turkish elites will be necessary to carry out these reforms. One should note that MHP parliamentarians voted “no” on the reform package despite the repeated reassurances from the MHP that they support EU membership.

Second, based on the emphasis on the political aspects of EU membership, it appears that Turkish MPs believe that significant improvements in the political system—primarily in the functioning of the democratic institutions and the improvement of human rights—will be necessary before obtaining full EU membership and that these improvements will be a result of finally achieving full membership. In other words, in the eyes of the political elite the prospect of EU membership is working to help consolidate democracy in Turkey and will ultimately guarantee that Turkey will be a consolidated democracy, a la Spain and Portugal.

The next most emphasized problem facing Turkish membership—as well as an advantage if Turkey is indeed accepted into the EU—is related to socio-economic development. This is not surprising given the current problems of inflation, income disparities and regional development disparities. It is apparent that many deputies realize that the level of development in Turkey lags significantly behind that of even the poorest EU country, and that—as in the case of political development—the process of preparing for full membership, as well as the membership itself, should dramatically improve the economy of Turkey. The financial problems facing Turkey since the November 2000 and February 2001 crises clearly illustrate the need for macroeconomic stability.

We encountered two potential problems in elite perceptions of Turkish-EU relations. The first of these was discussed extensively above, and relates to the Cyprus issue. The problem, as we see it, is that elites in Turkey do not perceive this issue to be a major obstacle to Turkish membership of the EU, implying that the other factors are more important and, if those are resolved, Turkey should still be able to enter the EU even if the dispute with Greece over Cyprus continues. Unless Greek leaders suddenly change their position on this issue, it seems highly unlikely that Greece will allow Turkey to join the EU if Turkey continues with the
position outlined by Ecevit (that there are two separate countries on Cyprus). The failure of our sample of deputies to acknowledge the importance of this problem indicates a lack of understanding of how the voting on the accession of new member states occurs within the EU (by unanimous vote in the EU Council of Ministers, with the assent of the European Parliament and each member state parliament). Thus, even though Cyprus is not part of the EU’s accession criteria, the EU’s decisionmaking structures will make it an equally important factor influencing Turkey’s accession.

This research has focused on political elite views of Turkish-EU relations. We should stress that—other than a few opinion polls—very little is known about mass opinion regarding the EU within Turkey, particularly regional and social sector variation in support of Turkish membership of the EU. However, the TESEV-sponsored mass opinion survey on Turkish people’s attitudes towards the EU conducted in spring 2002 (the results of which are discussed in this volume) is an important step in that regard. Thus, while our research can be seen as a “first attempt” at understanding the nature of opinion towards internationalized governance in Turkey, much more work in this area is necessary, particularly on mass opinion, which is likely to be quite different from the opinions of Turkish political elites. The national elections in Turkey that took place in November 2002 altered the configuration of the parliament. The newly founded Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), representing the religious and center-right conservative vote, and the Republican People’s Party, representing the social democratic vote, were elected to parliament. Although these two parties also repeatedly voice their support for EU membership, the November 2002 elections changed the Turkish political elite’s opinion, making it somewhat different from that pictured in this essay.

APPENDIX: THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
(ONLY THE PORTION RELATED TO EUROPEAN UNION ISSUES)

1. Are you in favor or opposed to Turkey eventually joining the EU as a full member? Would you say you are:

- [ ] Strongly in favor 1
- [ ] In favor 2
- [ ] Opposed 3
- [ ] Strongly opposed 4
- [ ] Don’t know 5
- [ ] Other 6
2. What about the citizens living in your district: Do you believe they are in favor, opposed, or do they not care very much whether Turkey joins the EU as a full member?

☐ They are definitely in favor 1
☐ They are mostly in favor 2
☐ They are mostly opposed 3
☐ They are definitely opposed 4
☐ They do not care one way or the other 5
☐ Don’t know 6

3. In your opinion, what is the most important obstacle that must be overcome before Turkey will be admitted to the EU as a full member?

4. What do you believe would be the best thing about Turkey becoming a full EU member?

5. What do you believe would be the worst thing about Turkey becoming a full EU member?

6. Do you believe that Turkey will eventually join the EU as a full member, and if so, in what time frame? Would you say that:

☐ Turkey will never join (Please explain below) 1
☐ Turkey will join within the next 5 years 2
☐ Turkey will join within the next 10 years 3
☐ Turkey will join within the next 15 years 4
☐ Turkey will join within the next 20 years 5
☐ Turkey will join, but it will take more than 20 years 6
☐ Other 7

a) [If response is “Turkey will never join”] Please explain.

7. The following is a list of potential obstacles for Turkey with regards to full membership in the EU. Please state which of these potential obstacles you consider to be important and then indicate on the list which is most important, second most important, etc.?

—The position of the military in politics 1
—The level of human rights violations in Turkey 2
—The level of democratization in Turkey 3
—The lack of economic development in Turkey 4
—The large size of the population in Turkey 5
—The problem in the southeastern part of the country 6
—Political Islam 7
—Turkey being a Muslim country 8
—The conflict with Greece over Cyprus 9
—Other 10

8. In your opinion, which group in Turkey will benefit most from full membership in the EU? (Please explain.)

9. Which group will suffer most? (Please explain.)

10. Does the recent change in the Austrian government affect Turkey’s prospects for joining the EU?
☐ Yes 1
☐ No 2

a) [If YES] Please explain.
11. Would any government change in any other country affect Turkey’s prospects for joining the EU?

☐ Yes 1
☐ No 2

a) [If YES] Please explain.

12. Which of the following statements best describes your belief about how the conflict with Greece over the Cyprus issue will eventually be resolved, or do you have another view on this?

☐ The only viable solution is for Northern Cyprus to be recognized as an independent sovereign state. 1
☐ The only viable solution is for Northern and Southern Cyprus to be reunited in a federal state, as equal parties. 2
☐ The issue will probably never be resolved. 3
☐ Other 4

a) [If “The issue will probably never be resolved”] Please explain.

For the following statements, can you please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or are undecided?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. In Turkish-Greek relations, the European Union tends to favor the Greek side.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Turkey’s sovereignty will be decreased considerably as a result of full membership in the EU.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Turkish institutions are currently capable of managing the process of adopting the EU criteria for full membership.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. A referendum should be conducted before Turkey enters the EU as a full member.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. If Turkey joins the EU, will it be able to comply with the requirements of the euro?

☐ Yes
☐ No

a) Please explain.
NOTES

Special thanks to Burcu Gezgör, Yusuf Gözükücü, Fatih Gülgonül, Ayşe Sargin and Ahu Tatlı for their invaluable assistance in conducting the interviews for this project. Any errors in interpretation are the sole responsibility of the authors.


2. The Copenhagen criteria consist of political aspects (the functioning of democratic institutions), economic aspects (the stability of macroeconomic factors and functioning market economy) and the adoption of the EU’s acquis communautaire.

3. Vast reforms have already been adopted in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) since October 2001. However, the adoption of these particular laws is likely to be only the first—albeit important—step in the process of actually having the type of political system that the EU envisions. In addition, there is some doubt as to whether the reforms that have been passed thus far are enough to meet EU political standards. Thus, the political will to continue with reforms must be present.

4. Another important factor in Turkey’s application for associate membership was, of course, Greece’s application for associate member status. The Turkish application was lodged just 16 days after the Greek application. Traditionally, Turkish policy has been to balance Greece in international organizations and platforms.

5. A military coup and disarray in the government after the military returned power to the civilian government delayed the signing.

6. These association agreements gave Turkey and Greece a privileged status in their relationship with the EC and acted as a testament to both their eligibility for membership and Europeanness. In all the other association agreements, specifically the Europe Agreements signed with the Central and Eastern European countries, such references to full membership were cleverly evaded, perhaps in the light of the Turkish experience.

7. In the 1970s there were several disagreements over key issues. For a summary, see Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp.53–74.


9. The current proposal by the European Commission suggests that in 2004 there will be a “big bang” enlargement that includes all of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) applicants, as well as Cyprus and Malta. The only CEE candidates not slated for full membership at that date are Romania and Bulgaria. It is not definite that the big bang will occur, but clearly countries like Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia will be admitted in the very near future.

10. This change in the configuration of preferences was seemingly due to two factors. One was the September 1998 general election in Germany, which produced a Social Democratic-Green governing coalition. From the start of this new government’s term the leadership was quite clear about its support for Turkish membership of the EU. The other important change in the configuration was that Greece became considerably less hostile toward Turkey, presumably prompted by the major earthquakes that hit the Istanbul and Athens areas in August and September 1999. These natural disasters produced a significant warming of Turkish-Greek relations as the two sides moved to assist one another with rescue and relief efforts. See Ayten Gündoğdu, “Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol.5, No.1 (March 2001), <http://meria.idc.ac.il>.
11. The EU claims that until Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria accession negotiations with Turkey cannot begin.


17. For example, in 1997 Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean Claude Junckers stated with regard to Turkey that “the EU cannot sit at a negotiating table with a country where torture is widespread.” See Nurdan Bernard, “Turkey Pains in the Summit,” *Yeni Yüzyıl* (Turkish Daily Newspaper), Dec. 13, 1997.


24. For further information on the Turkish population figures, see <http://www.die.gov.tr/konular/nufusSayimi.htm>.

25. As the Nice summit occurred several months after these interviews, we do not contend that the deputies are reacting to the Nice summit results in this survey. However, even before Nice, it was common knowledge that Turkey had a very large and very poor population and, for this reason, we expected that deputies might think this is one of the causes for problematic relations with the EU.

26. Members of parliament have rather busy schedules, and we realized that they might give hasty responses to our questions. For this reason, we posed this particular question in two different ways so that the MP would have another chance to think carefully about it. In addition, in previous research conducted by McLaren (2000) certain issues—such as Cyprus and the role of the military—were severely de-emphasized. Thus, the current survey attempted to understand if the respondent would “remember” that these issues were important once they were presented together in a list.


30. For the positions of Turkey and the EU on Cyprus, see pp.55–78 of this volume.
31. The Accession Partnership is also relatively clear about this, but since it was released long after this survey was conducted, the deputies could not possibly be taking cues from it.
34. Another five percent gave an answer that did not fit into any of these categories.
35. However, because of the small sample size, some caution in interpreting these results is advised.
36. Note that since we are trying to make inferences here about the views of party members in the parliament we have weighted the responses according to the actual size of the party in the TBMM.
40. Ibid.
41. The question posed to the MPs was as follows: Would any government change in any other country affect Turkey’s prospects for joining the EU?