Research
The Rise of Monogamy
This paper offers a new theory that explains why polygyny marriage has almost disappeared in modern industrialized countries although it had been common in most of the societies throughout history. I demonstrate that the increase in labor income through the process of economic development has led to the rise of monogamy. Specifically, I show in a general equilibrium model of marriage market that the increase in labor income improves women’s outside option, monogamy mating. This, in turn, reduces polygyny by increasing the cost of polygyny mating for men. This theory is the first one to explain the phenomenon with emphasizing cost-side changes and complements previous demand-side theories. Moreover, the theory points to a supply- side mechanism of the negative correlation between the quantity and quality of children.
The Masquerade Ball of the CEOs and the Mask of Excessive Risk (with Eren Inci)
We analyze the effects of CEOs’ layoff risk on their risk choice while overseeing a firm. A CEO, whose managerial ability is unknown, is fired if her expected ability is below average. Her risk choice changes the informativeness of output and market’s belief about her ability. She can decrease her layoff risk by taking excessive risk and trade off current compensation for layoff risk. The firm may voluntarily or involuntarily allow excessive risk taking even under optimal linear compensation contracts. Above-average CEOs always keep their jobs, but among below-average CEOs, a higher ability one is more likely to be fired.
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Research in Progress
The Relative Performance Evaluation Puzzle and Manager Turnover
Garage and Curbside Parking with Heterogeneous Drivers (with Eren Inci)
Regulation of Shopping Hours: Welfare Implications