Research

Research Areas

Bargaining Theory, Mechanism Design, Political Economy, Decision Theory, Behavioral Economics

Working Papers (available upon request)

“Arbiter Assignment” (with M. Oğuz Afacan and Nejat Anbarcı), SSRN working paper, March 2022

“How to Increase Contributions in Partnerships: An Experimental Study of Surplus Sharing” (with Begüm Güney and Arzu Kıbrıs), SSRN working paper, October 2020.

Publications

Behavioral Interventions to Increase Adherence to Palivizumab Prophylaxis in Children with Congenital Heart Disease” (with E Erolu, Y Tosun, EZ Başar, Ö Pamukçu, Aİ Yıldırım, S Epçeçan, Y Dönmez, Y Giray, O Taşçı, P Dervişoğlu), Cardiology in the Young (forthcoming).

Persistence of Voice Pitch Bias Against Policy Differences” (with A. Ceren Cinar), Political Science Research and Methods (forthcoming).

A Random Reference Model” (with Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Elchin Suleymanov), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (forthcoming).

Social Media and Press Freedom” (with Korhan Koçak), British Journal of Political Science, (2023), 53:1, 140-162.

A Theory of Reference Point Formation” (with Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Elchin Suleymanov), Economic Theory, (2023), 75, 137-166.

Protectionist Demands in Globalization” (with Arzu Kıbrıs and Mehmet Yiğit Gürdal), Review of Economic Design, (2022), 26, 345-365.

Negotiation as a Cooperative Game“, in Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation: Second Edition, Springer, eds: Marc Kilgour and Colin Eden, (2021), Springer.

State Society Relations in Civil Conflicts” (with Arzu Kıbrıs), Terrorism and Political Violence, (2020), 32:1, 138-166.

An Experimental Study of the Investment Implications of Bankruptcy Laws” (with M. Büyükboyacı, M. Y. Gürdal and A. Kıbrıs), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, (2019), 158, 607-629.

Limited Attention with Status Quo Bias” (with Mark Dean and Yusufcan Masatlıoğlu), Journal of Economic Theory, (2017), 169, 93-127.

On Surplus-Sharing in Partnerships” (with Arzu Kıbrıs), Social Choice and Welfare, (2016), 47:1, 89-111.

On the Dynamics of Extremist Violence” (with Arzu Kıbrıs), Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, (2016), 22:1, 1-25.

A Mechanism Design Approach to Allocating Central Government Funds Among Regional Development Agencies” (with İpek Gürsel Tapkı),  Review of Economic Design, (2014), 16:4, 269-282.

“On the Investment Implications of Bankruptcy Laws” (with Arzu Kıbrıs), Games and Economic Behavior, (2013), 80, 85-99. (slides)

“On Recursive Solutions to Simple Allocation Problems”,, Theory and Decision, (2013), 75, 449-463.

“Nash Bargaining in Ordinal Environments”, Review of Economic Design, (2012): Vol. 16(4), 269-282.

A Revealed Preference Analysis of Solutions to Simple Allocation Problems“, Theory and Decision, (2012): Vol. 72(4), 509-523.

“Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable Rules” (with İpek Gürsel Tapkı), Mathematical Social Sciences, (2011): Vol. 62(3), 151-161.

“Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic Rules” (with İpek Gürsel Tapkı), Games and Economic Behavior, (2010), Vol. 68(1), 233-241.

Cooperative Game Theory Approaches to Negotiation, in Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, eds: Marc Kilgour and Colin Eden, (2010), Springer.

Trade Rules for Uncleared Markets” (with Serkan Kucuksenel), Social Choice and Welfare, (2008): Vol. 32, 101-121.

Allocating multiple commodities among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences? (with Anirban Kar), Social Choice and Welfare, (2008): Vol. 31(4), 641-666.

Bargaining over a Finite Set of Alternatives” (with Murat R. Sertel), Social Choice and Welfare, (2007): Vol. 28, 421-437.

Egalitarianism in Ordinal Bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule“, Games and Economic Behavior (2004): Vol. 49(1), 157-170.

Bargaining Power in Stationary Parallelogram Games” (with Bart Taub), Review of Economic Design (2004): Vol. 8(4), 449-465.

Ordinal Invariance in Multicoalitional Bargaining“, Games and Economic Behavior (2004): Vol. 46(1), 76-87.

Consistency, Converse Consistency, and Aspirations in Coalitional Games” (with Toru Hokari), Mathematical Social Sciences (2003), Vol. 45(3), 313-331

Constrained Allocation Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences: An Axiomatic Analysis“, Social Choice and Welfare (2003), Vol. 20(3), 353-362

Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies?, Games and Economic Behavior (2002): Vol. 39, 91-110.